New Fortress Energy (NFE) faces A reverse split, is the stock still cheap? September 15, 2026 New Fortress Energy (NFE) has seen a cluster of boardroom changes and capital actions, including a 1 for 50 stock split set for September 14, 2026, that together reshape how investors might view the shares. Recent trading has been rough for New Fortress Energy, with the share price down 45.6% over 90 days and 75% year to date, and total shareholder returns declining 86.1% over one year, which points to fading momentum despite a 7.6% gain over the past week. Scan beyond New Fortress Energy and compare this setup with a hand-picked 35 high quality undervalued stocks that currently combines depressed share prices with stronger fundamentals. New Fortress Energy is now trading at a fraction of where it was a year ago, with a 1-for-50 split about to reset the share count. Does that make today's price compelling, or does patience still look cheaper? Price-to-Sales of 0.1x: Is it justified? On simple revenue terms, New Fortress Energy looks extremely compressed, with a P/S of 0.1x compared with 1x for close peers and 2x for the broader US Oil and Gas group. That gap sits beside an SWS DCF fair value estimate of $93.99 versus a last close of $13.88, which frames how far expectations have reset. P/S compares the market value of the equity to annual sales. It is often used for capital intensive businesses where earnings move around, because it anchors on top line activity rather than short term profit swings. For New Fortress Energy, the low multiple comes against reported revenue of $1,266.65m and a market cap of about $79.24m. The compression in that ratio lines up with a tougher fundamental picture. New Fortress Energy remains unprofitable, with losses of $1,896.89m and a track record of losses increasing at 66.8% per year over the past 5 years. The group also reports negative shareholder equity, less than one year of cash runway, and all liabilities funded through higher risk sources such as external borrowing rather than deposits, which can justify investor caution even at a low P/S. Relative to context, the 0.1x P/S is far below both the 2x industry average and the 1x peer average. This signals the market is heavily discounting the business compared with similar energy players. That kind of gap often reflects concerns that current sales may not translate into durable cash generation, especially when a firm is unprofitable and has a stretched balance sheet, rather than a simple bargain on headline revenue. Result: Price-to-Sales of 0.1x (UNDERVALUED). DCF fair value of $93.99: what it says about New Fortress Energy. The SWS DCF model currently estimates a future cash flow value of $93.99 per share for New Fortress Energy, compared with a spot price of $13.88. This indicates a very large discount if those projections play out. That implies the market price is reflecting a far more cautious path for future cash generation than the model output. A discounted cash flow approach projects the cash the business might produce in future years and then discounts those amounts back to today using a required rate of return. The SWS model then sums those discounted figures to reach an intrinsic value per share, which can be compared against the current market price. For New Fortress Energy, the tension between a very low P/S ratio and a high DCF value against price highlights how sharply investors are weighing risks such as consistent losses, negative equity, and limited cash runway. The wide gap between the intrinsic estimate and the current share price suggests that the model assumes meaningful future cash generation from the terminals, infrastructure, and LNG shipping operations that is not reflected in today's market valuation. Result: DCF Fair value of $93.99 (UNDERVALUED). Still, New Fortress Energy faces real pressure from ongoing losses of US$1,896.891m and negative shareholder equity. This could keep funding risk firmly in focus. Another view on New Fortress Energy's valuation. On one hand, New Fortress Energy trades on a very low 0.1x P/S. On the other, the SWS DCF model points to a future cash flow value of $93.99 per share versus a market price of $13.88, which flags the stock as heavily undervalued on that framework. That kind of gap tells you two different stories. The P/S suggests investors are heavily discounting the business today. In contrast, the cash flow model assumes much stronger value creation ahead. The question for you is which set of assumptions feels more realistic given New Fortress Energy's recent losses and balance sheet pressure. Simply Wall St performs a discounted cash flow (DCF) on every stock in the world every day (check out New Fortress Energy for example). We show the entire calculation in full. You can track the result in your watchlist or portfolio and be alerted when this changes, or use our stock screener to discover 35 high quality undervalued stocks. If you save a screener we even alert you when new companies match - so you never miss a potential opportunity. Next steps. Mixed signals around New Fortress Energy can make it hard to know what matters most, so move quickly, review the numbers independently, and weigh both sides of the story using the 1 key reward and 4 important warning signs Looking for more investment ideas beyond New Fortress Energy? If New Fortress Energy has your attention, do not stop there. Broader opportunity often sits in fresh ideas that match your style and risk comfort. * Target higher income potential by reviewing 6 dividend fortresses that may help anchor your portfolio with sizeable cash returns. * Hunt for mispriced opportunities by scanning the 15 high quality undiscovered gems before other investors catch on. * Prioritise capital preservation and a smoother ride potential by focusing on the 11 resilient stocks with low risk scores built around more resilient profiles. This article by Simply Wall St is general in nature. We provide commentary based on historical data and analyst forecasts only using an unbiased methodology and our articles are not intended to be financial advice. It does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any stock, and does not take account of your objectives, or your financial situation. We aim to bring you long-term focused analysis driven by fundamental data. Note that our analysis may not factor in the latest price-sensitive company announcements or qualitative material. Simply Wall St has no position in any stocks mentioned. Valuation is complex, but we're here to simplify it. Discover if New Fortress Energy might be undervalued or overvalued with our detailed analysis, featuring fair value estimates, potential risks, dividends, insider trades, and its financial condition. Have feedback on this article? Concerned about the content? Get in touch with us directly. Alternatively, email [email protected]

Pomerantz defeats motion to dismiss in in re New Fortress Energy, Inc. sec. Litig. Pomerantz, together with Co-Counsel, defeated the defendants' attempt to dismiss a securities fraud complaint against New Fortress Energy, Inc. ("NFE") and its senior executives concerning misrepresentations made about the construction status and timeline of NFE's floating liquefied natural gas project ("FLNG1") in Altamira, Mexico. The case alleges that the defendants, in the beginning of the Class Period, created a mirage of progress at an investor day by falsely presenting an unfinished main turbine as substantially complete. NFE also allegedly shipped FLNG1 offshore, knowing that construction was incomplete, but told investors the exact opposite. According to multiple confidential witness accounts obtained by Pomerantz and Co-Counsel, difficulties with meeting FLNG1's construction targets only worsened with time, causing NFE to repeatedly shift timelines for the project's completion. The defendants failed to disclose these adverse facts. Instead, they represented to investors that everything was on track and on budget, even as mechanical completion dates slipped from March 2023 to August 2024. When the truth emerged about the reasons for the delays, the company's share price plummeted from nearly $60 a share at the beginning of the Class Period to less than $15 a share by its end. The Court's decision to deny dismissal of the claims rejected every single argument the defendants raised. The Court found that the safe harbor protection under the PSLRA - which shields companies from legal claims arising from their forward-looking statements that turn out to be inaccurate - does not apply to current misrepresentations of fact or omissions of material fact, even if the statement rendered misleading by the omission was forward-looking. It rejected the defendants' contentions that the defendants' misrepresentations amounted to mere puffery or were otherwise inactionable opinions. The Court also concluded that the plaintiffs adequately pled scienter - i.e., intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud - based on both the defendants' conscious misbehavior and a motive to commit fraud. Conscious misbehavior is pled by showing that a defendant: (1) knew facts or had access to information suggesting the representations it made were false or misleading; (2) engaged in illegal activity; or (3) failed to check information that the defendant was obligated to monitor. Most securities fraud complaints rely and are sustained on the first point, with the second and third very rarely invoked. Without a motive, conscious misbehavior must be pled such that the strength of the circumstantial allegations is correspondingly greater. Here, the plaintiffs succeeded in meeting the first point based on the accounts of multiple confidential witnesses as well as the fact that FLNG1 is of paramount importance to the defendants. Many confidential witnesses had hands-on experience with FLNG1's construction, and some provided particularized facts of the defendants' state of mind. On paper, conscious misbehavior seems harder to plead than motive. That is why plaintiffs rely on multiple factors to convince a court of the pleading's sufficiency, bolstering claims, when they can, with the accounts of former employees, reviewing all public information to identify a defendant's statements of knowledge or admissions of adverse facts, and sometimes hiring experts to explain to a court why, given the nature of a company's business or the industry, a defendant would understand that his or her representations to investors were false. However, in practice, despite its simplicity, the motive to commit fraud poses the most significant obstacle for a plaintiff to plead scienter at the preliminary stage of litigation. This is because, since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995, the federal courts have been dismissive towards a plaintiff's allegations of motive, often refusing to sustain complaints even when excessive and suspect executive compensation could be apparent to a lay person. Except for rare cases involving large, suspiciously timed stock sales, motive allegations based on other forms of compensation, including bonuses, are routinely rejected. The Court's decision in NFE is thus a refreshing change from this unfortunate trend. In the beginning of the Class Period, NFE boosted the hype around FLNG1 by raising its earnings target from $1.5 billion to over $2.5 billion and approving a radically different dividend policy that increased declared dividends from $0.10 per share to $3.00 per share. In January 2023, NFE issued a $3.00 dividend in the amount of approximately $626 million. This was the one and only time that NFE ever paid a $3.00 dividend. At the time of the January 2023 dividend, NFE's CEO owned and/or beneficially controlled over 72.6 million shares of NFE's common stock. This allowed him to control NFE's board of directors to approve the dividend, and to reap massive personal proceeds from the dividend payment. Given his ownership of stock, the January 2023 dividend resulted in NFE's CEO receiving a cash payment of approximately $217 million, personally pocketing about 35% of every dollar the dividend paid out. The investor interest that the CEO created in FLNGI caused NFE to be overvalued, making possible the oversized dividend payment. The Court ruled that the facts pled by the plaintiffs were more than sufficient to allege a concrete and particularized benefit to plead motive because of the size and timing of the dividend distribution and the enormous windfall that benefited NFE's CEO. To its knowledge, this is the first time that a court in the Second Circuit has correctly ruled that the payment of extraordinary dividends alone can be sufficient to plead a strong inference of fraud. Multiple decisions in the Southern District of New York had ruled the opposite before. Yukos Oil Company, a decision heavily relied upon by the defense bar, including in this litigation, is illustrative. There, the defendants collectively received $1.2 billion in dividends, but the district court dismissed the complaint, finding that the defendants benefited in the same way as all shareholders who also received dividends. But that was not true. Ordinary shareholders of companies do not receive over a billion dollars in dividends. Nor did the plaintiffs and other ordinary shareholders of NFE receive such a windfall. A court in the Southern District of New York has finally recognized what should have been obvious all along: an executive engineering a $217 million personal windfall through hype he himself created is not an ordinary shareholder - He is the fraud. The Court's decision in NFE should become settled law in the Second Circuit. The case is now in discovery. Bolstered by the accounts of confidential witnesses with intricate knowledge of FLNG1 and public information alone, the complaint was strong enough to defeat dismissal on every ground. The ruling on the motion to dismiss was rare not only in upholding allegations of a motive to commit fraud, but rarer still for doing so on facts that courts had previously refused to credit. The plaintiffs expect discovery to sharpen what already appears to be a compelling case. Investor Alerts

ONEOK generated nearly $33.6 billion in revenue for fiscal year 2025, a 55.4% increase year-over-year, with net income of $3.4 billion and free cash flow of $2.5 billion. The midstream energy company operates 60,000 miles of pipelines for natural gas and refined products across the United States, relying on long-term, fee-based contracts. By contrast, New Fortress Energy reported $1.5 billion in revenue for fiscal year 2025, down over 36% from the prior year, whilst posting a net loss of $1.8 billion and negative free cash flow of $1.49 billion. The LNG-focused infrastructure company faces risks from ongoing restructuring and heavy reliance on PREPA, which is in bankruptcy proceedings. The comparison highlights divergent financial trajectories between a stable midstream operator and a high-risk growth play.