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Red Hat sells enterprise open-source software with a subscription model that includes updates, security patches, and professional support. Its products—RHEL for hybrid cloud servers, OpenShift for containerized apps, and the Ansible Automation Platform for IT automation—are open-source at core but provided with guaranteed enterprise support. Red Hat differentiates itself by pairing open-source code with a deep services layer and an integrated stack designed for hybrid/multicloud environments, backed by IBM. Its goal is to help large organizations deploy, manage, and scale open-source software across complex IT landscapes with reliable software and predictable, ongoing support.
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Red Hat working to improve memory tiering for QEMU VMs to save RAM. Red Hat engineers are working through a few possible approaches to enhance memory tiering for QEMU-based virtual machines to help in conserving memory. Ultimately they are after leveraging NVMe SSDs in more scenarios for QEMU VMs to save on RAM usage given today's sky high memory pricing. Red Hat virtualization engineer Peter Xu presented at the KVM Forum 2026 this week in Vancouver, Canada on QEMU memory tiering. The goal is for making QEMU VM jive better with memory tiering so that relatively cheaper NVMe SSDs can be engaged in more situations in place of DRAM while still delivering good performance. Among the avenues being evaluated are a new maccess(0 system call, QEMU full user-space tiering with QEMU being responsible for owning the slow tier, or using existing kernel APIs for migrating hotness. That last approach sounds like the lead contender right now with no kernel changes needed and small QEMU changes. That last approach can be further improved upon with addressing kernel limitations of MADV_PAGEOUT behavior via a new kernel patch.
Egypt's NTI hosts Chinese delegation to explore AI and digital economy cooperation. November 13, 2026 The engagement forms part of NTI's efforts to expand its international partnerships, strengthen technology cooperation and facilitate the exchange of expertise with global institutions. Egypt's National Telecommunication Institute (NTI) has received a high-level delegation from China's Zhejiang Province to explore opportunities for cooperation in artificial intelligence (AI), telecommunications and the digital economy. The delegation, which represented Zhejiang Province's Department of Economy and Information Technology, was led by Chan Jiaxiang, Deputy Director of the provincial department, and included officials responsible for industry, the digital economy and information technology. The visit took place on October 12, 2026, at NTI's headquarters in Smart Village, Cairo. The discussions focused on NTI's experience in training and developing skilled professionals to meet the needs of Egypt's information and communications technology (ICT) sector and support the industry locally and internationally. The meeting was chaired by Dr Ahmed Khattab, Director of NTI, who led discussions on strengthening cooperation and exchanging expertise in telecommunications and information technology. Both sides also explored potential collaboration in AI research, technology development and deployment, as well as opportunities for partnerships in the digital economy and digital transformation. They exchanged views on how to leverage their respective expertise and resources to support innovation, knowledge sharing and technology transfer. The discussions further examined opportunities for Chinese specialised training and qualification academies to operate through NTI, alongside other international academies hosted by the institute. The proposed cooperation would focus on training and professional development in advanced telecommunications and ICT technologies. NTI currently hosts and collaborates with several international technology academies, including Cisco Academy, Huawei Academy, Amazon Web Services (AWS) Academy and Red Hat Academy. These programmes provide practical training in areas such as networking, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and cloud computing, while preparing participants for internationally recognised certifications. The engagement forms part of NTI's efforts to expand its international partnerships, strengthen technology cooperation and facilitate the exchange of expertise with global institutions. The TechAfrica News Podcast
Red Hat Quay flaws expose private images and tenant tokens. Red Hat Quay has two critical flaws that let attackers reach private container images and other tenants' robot account tokens. One flaw affects any Quay registry an attacker can access, and the other lets a Quay user who can create a namespace steal robot account tokens from other tenants. Quay registry access and key trust. The first flaw gives an attacker the ability to read and overwrite private images in every repository once they can reach a Quay registry. Anonymous access is enabled by default, so no account is needed while that setting remains on. If anonymous access is turned off, a valid account is enough, and Red Hat said that the company released fixed builds for eight Quay 3 branches yesterday. The issue is tracked as CVE-2026-123710 with a CVSS score of 9.8. Quay signs access tokens with keys it trusts for image pushes and pulls, and the flaw lets an attacker add a key that Quay will trust without any expiry date. After that, Quay accepts tokens signed with that key for any repository. Those tokens let the attacker retrieve private images and any secrets or credentials stored inside them. They also let the attacker push or overwrite images, and the modified image then spreads to every system that later pulls it. The planted key stays in place across restarts until someone removes it, and it can also be used to delete the keys that running Quay instances rely on, which causes normal pushes and pulls to fail with authentication errors. How the key server check fails. Quay's key server is supposed to verify that a request to replace a key carries a token signed by a trusted key, together with the expected audience and issuer. It does not verify that the token was issued for key rotation. An anonymous token from Quay's /v2/auth endpoint passes the check because Quay signs it with a trusted key and the caller chooses its audience. Red Hat's Dave O'Connor found both flaws. The logic behind CVE-2026-123710 has been present in Quay since its first public commit, according to the bug report for that flaw. Red Hat lists every version of Quay 3 and Quay 5 as affected by both flaws, and its guidance for CVE-2026-123710 includes standalone installs, Quay deployed by the Quay Operator on OpenShift, and the mirror registry for Red Hat OpenShift. Shared exposure and listed fixes. Any Quay instance that untrusted clients can reach is exposed, including internal registries, the company says. When checked today, the CVE entry for CVE-2026-123710 still showed every Quay package as affected with no fix, even though each advisory lists the flaw. The company recommends blocking the /keys endpoint at the proxy or load balancer for everything except trusted internal components. It also recommends searching the audit logs for service_key_rotate and service_key_delete events where expiration_date is null, removing any approved service keys that are not recognized, and installing the fixed release. Until the fixed release is running, an attacker can add a new key the same way, so deleting one does not last. Red Hat says that turning off anonymous access does not protect against the flaw. A planted key also keeps working after password resets and changes to the robot token. Namespace matching and robot account theft. The second critical flaw, CVE-2026-110697 with a CVSS score of 9.9, was disclosed at the same time. It lets a Quay user who can create a namespace steal other tenants' robot account tokens and use them to read, push, or overwrite those tenants' images. The flaw sits in the code that lists robot accounts, where Quay builds an SQL LIKE pattern from the namespace name without escaping wildcard characters, and an underscore matches any single character in SQL LIKE. A namespace with an underscore in the right place can match another tenant's namespace and return its robot accounts, along with their decrypted tokens. The attacker needs no elevated privileges, and the victim does not have to do anything. Deleting the attacker's namespace also deletes the matching robot accounts, which can cut off systems that depend on them. OpenShift pipeline exposure and remaining gaps. Where Quay serves as the integrated registry for OpenShift, stolen robot credentials can be used to inject malicious images into CI/CD pipelines, the company says. For CVE-2026-110697, Red Hat's CVE page names the same eight releases as fixed, calls updating the only complete fix, and says Quay.io is already fixed. None of the eight advisories list CVE-2026-110697. Until an update is installed, the company suggests limiting who can create organizations or namespaces containing an underscore, rotating robot tokens for any namespace that matches an underscore namespace, and watching for pulls or pushes that do not fit normal robot use. Those steps reduce exposure, but the flaw remains. The upstream fix adds the missing rotation check, requires keys added through the key server to have an expiry date, and stops callers from choosing a token's audience. The same change fixes the robot account search too.
Critical Red Hat Quay flaw exposes every private container image in a registry. RedSide Security November 12, 2026 Vulnerability 168 views Red Hat has disclosed and patched a critical vulnerability in its Quay container registry that allows an attacker with network access to the registry to read and overwrite private container images across every repository it hosts. The flaw is notable not just for its severity but for how little an attacker needs to exploit it. According to the advisory summarized by The Hacker News, Quay ships with anonymous access enabled by default. While that setting remains on, an unauthenticated attacker can abuse the flaw without any account at all. If anonymous access has been disabled, the exposure narrows but does not disappear: any user holding a valid account can still exploit the issue. In practice, that means the registry's entire private image inventory - including images in repositories the attacker should never be able to touch - is at risk. The impact goes beyond confidentiality. Because the flaw permits overwriting as well as reading, an attacker could replace trusted images with tampered ones. Container images are frequently pulled automatically by CI/CD pipelines, Kubernetes clusters, and production hosts, so a poisoned image can propagate quickly and quietly through an environment. That combination of read and write access to every repository makes this a supply chain concern as much as a registry permissions bug. Fixed builds released. Red Hat has published fixed builds for eight Quay releases, and operators are urged to upgrade immediately. Given the breadth of the flaw - affecting all repositories rather than a single namespace - patching should be treated as urgent rather than routine. Organizations running Quay should also review their exposure while remediation is underway. Mitigation guidance. Where immediate patching is not possible, disabling anonymous access reduces the attack surface by removing the no-credential path. However, Red Hat's own description makes clear this is only a partial mitigation, since authenticated users can still trigger the flaw. Network-level restrictions - limiting who can reach the registry API - add another layer of defense, but neither substitute for the fix. Administrators should also treat the window before patching as a potential compromise period. Recommended checks include: * Audit image digests and tags for unexpected changes, particularly in repositories that hold base images or deployment artifacts. * Review registry access logs for anomalous pulls, pushes, or API calls from unfamiliar sources. * Verify image signatures where signing is in use, and re-validate any images pulled during the exposure window. * Rotate credentials for accounts and service tokens with registry access if tampering is suspected. Why this matters for container supply chains. Registries are high-value targets precisely because they sit upstream of everything else. A registry that cannot enforce repository-level isolation undermines the access controls teams believe they have configured. The default-on anonymous access setting in Quay compounds the problem: many deployments may never have consciously chosen to expose the registry, yet find themselves in the unauthenticated attack path by configuration default. This incident fits a broader pattern of container infrastructure becoming a preferred entry point for attackers. Image registries, build systems, and artifact repositories are increasingly probed for weaknesses that allow silent substitution of trusted software. Defenders should assume that any registry reachable from untrusted networks is a candidate for this class of attack and should apply defense in depth: patching promptly, minimizing anonymous access, segmenting registry networks, and continuously verifying the integrity of what gets deployed. For Quay operators, the immediate action is straightforward: identify your version, apply the fixed build, and confirm that anonymous access is disabled unless there is a documented business reason to keep it on. Then look backward at logs and image digests to establish whether anything changed before the patch landed. The bottom line. A registry-wide read-and-write flaw in Red Hat Quay gives attackers a path to both steal and tamper with private container images, with unauthenticated exploitation possible under default settings. Fixed builds are available for eight releases. Patch now, restrict access in the interim, and audit your images for signs of tampering.
Introducing Red Hat cloud extensions: Sovereign AI clouds on your own infrastructure. Content designer Senior Manager If you've spent the last year provisioning AI and infrastructure capacity for tenants who can't use a public cloud, you've felt this firsthand: the hardware is local, but the operational model still isn't. Keeping data on local soil is only the first step. True digital sovereignty demands hard multi-tenant isolation, operational control, and total freedom from vendor lock-in. Red Hat is introducing Red Hat cloud extensions, built on the Open Sovereign AI Cloud (OSAC) open source project, to help address that challenge. Red Hat cloud extensions let cloud providers offer Red Hat OpenShift clusters, virtual machines (VMs), bare-metal hosts, and AI model serving through a single interface, on their own sovereign infrastructure. Built as add-ons to Red Hat's existing products, Red Hat cloud extensions deliver hard multi-tenant, interface-driven service provider capabilities to sovereign AI clouds, neoclouds, and local cloud providers. Unified multi-tenancy for your existing Red Hat stack. Red Hat OpenShift already gives you a unified application platform for building and running containers, VMs, and AI workloads on your hardware. Building on it means the same hardened, consistent foundation across every environment you run, on infrastructure you control. But when you need to offer those resources to multiple internal teams or external tenants, management gets messy. You end up juggling separate tools for clusters, VMs, bare metal, and AI serving. Cloud extensions add the missing operational layer. They sit on top of your existing Red Hat AI stack, including Red Hat OpenShift, Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization, and Red Hat OpenShift AI, and wraps everything in a unified API with built-in multi-tenancy, metering, billing, observability, and resource isolation. Figure 1: The Red Hat cloud extensions platform as 4 services - bare metal, clusters, models, and VMs - on a shared Red Hat OpenShift stack for containers, VMs, and AI. Instead of just operating a platform, you can now offer 4 core cloud services: * Bare-Metal-as-a-Service (BMaaS): Bare-metal hosts with provisioning that mirrors what you'd expect from a public cloud, without sending the workload off-premises. * Cluster-as-a-Service (CaaS): Tenant-scoped Red Hat OpenShift clusters on hosted control planes, provisioned through the same API. * Model-as-a-Service (MaaS): The piece that turns the stack into an AI cloud. Enables organizations to serve centralized model endpoints powered by Red Hat AI with per-tenant token metering, quotas, and rate limiting. * VMs-as-a-Service (VMaaS): VMs through OpenShift Virtualization, under the same tenant boundary as everything else. This blog post is the first in a series that'll walk through each service in depth. Early partner engagements, including sovereign AI work with telcos and neoclouds, are validating this architecture on NVIDIA H200 GPU infrastructure. In addition, Red Hat has achieved AI Cloud Ready status for the NVIDIA Cloud Partner (NCP) program. By aligning with the NCP software reference architecture and validation specifications for ISVs, Red Hat provides a consistent foundation for repeatable AI factory deployments. Operating the platform behind the interface. Red Hat cloud extensions turn your core Red Hat stack into a single sovereign operational engine: * Identity and access: Every tenant needs a clear authentication boundary, answering who can spin up a cluster, who can deploy a model, who can only consume resources. Red Hat build of Keycloak provides that identity layer on infrastructure you control. * Fleet management: Sovereign cloud providers rarely operate a single cluster. Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes gives platform teams a consistent view across many Red Hat OpenShift clusters, policy, governance, and upgrades, while workloads and data stay on-premises. * Automation at scale: Tenant onboarding, bare-metal networking, storage plumbing, and lifecycle operations are not one-click problems. Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform handles the workflows that APIs initiate but don't finish on their own. These layers sit under the same fulfillment API described above, so identity, fleet governance, and runbooks are built into the platform, not bolted on after the fact. Sovereignty runs through all of it. This matters when you need to: * Enforce local data residency to meet compliance requirements * Keep workloads, models, and data on infrastructure you operate * Hold encryption keys in your own environment * Run high-performance compute and GPU fabrics fully on-premises What's next? Red Hat cloud extensions are currently in Developer Preview. Over the coming months, Red Hat, Inc.'ll publish dedicated technical deep dives into each of the 4 core services, including CaaS, BMaaS, VMaaS, and MaaS. * Get involved: Explore and contribute to the OSAC project on GitHub * Listen: Check out the Red Hat Summit 2026 Keynote to learn more about API service fulfillment * Explore: Learn more with an interactive demo * Discover: Read Red Hat's blueprint for sovereign AI to explore the 4 pillars of digital sovereignty and multi-tenancy Product trial Red Hat OpenShift AI (self-managed) | Product trial. An open source machine learning (ML) platform for the hybrid cloud.
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Industries
Company Size
10,001+
Company Stage
IPO
Headquarters
Raleigh, NC
Founded
1993
Find jobs on Simplify and start your career today
Don't see your dream role? Check out thousands of other roles on Simplify.Browse all jobs